Visibly, the UN climate road show moves on, without its specific roadmap to Poland in December 2008 and Denmark in 2009. Whether the roadmap would be, it is apparently clear from the Bali talks that the interest of LDCs, which would be the worst victims of climate change, has been grossly ignored by the developed and advanced developing countries; both are in the race of
increasingly GhG emission. And, ironically, Bali conference fails to instigate any political commitment for quantitative reduction of GhG even within the framework of Kyoto Protocol. Although the protocol asked the developed countries to cut carbon emissions by an average of about 5 percent from 1990 level by the period 2008-2012 but for many reasons, especially the
negligence of the countries of larger economies, the actual cuts produced by 2012 will be much smaller. Many countries, belonging to the Annex 1 of Kyoto Protocol2 which were on binding commitments on GhG emission reduction
are failed to miss their target by a long way Hence, the 4th IPCC report has added urgency to the quest for deeper cuts
saying that ‘ time is not our side, if we want to keep temperature rise below 2 degree C, global emissions need to peak by 2015 and then be reduced by at least 50 percent by 2050 (from 1990 levels). This means industrialized countries cutting their emissions by at least 30 percent by 2020 and by at least 80 percent by 2050. Taking these all in consideration it was expected
that Bali conference would result firm political commitment for GhG reduction for saving the Earth from increasingly climate catastrophes. But from the very beginning of Bali negotiation the United States, that in all the ways was very critics to Kyoto Protocol, showed their negativism on the mitigation measures and was unwilling to sign on to the binding emission reduction commitments without action from large emitters in the developing world like China, India, Brazil. In contrary, the developing countries made it clear that they won’t accept mandatory limits on their emissions. In fact, from a moral, legal and practical perspective, the initial burden of emissions reductions has to fall on the industrialized countries.

Kyoto Protocol also asked for ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ for the advanced developing countries for GhG reduction. The first draft of the Bali text also reiterated the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’-which noted the historical responsibility of industrialized (Annex I) countries for virtually all emissions leading to the increase in the global atmospheric concentration of GhG. This text also urged for setting a near-term target for the Annex I countries for 25-40 percent emissions reductions; while theEuropean Union embraced this text, the American negotiators denied vehemently.

Besides, in all the side meetings through out the week, the American negotiators have tried to point out that no current legislation, nor Warner-Lieberman, nor any other bill, contemplated that level of near-term reductions and, they said flatly that the UAS was not going to agree to something in the text on which they saw no prospect of delivering. Therefore, due the strong opposition from the US lobby, the USA and partly Japan, Canada, the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Actions under
Convention’ removed all the quantitative language from the text replacing with qualitative language and included a phrase regarding the need for a ‘peak and decline’ in emission without stating any timeframes, which has kept left for negotiation during next two years period. Therefore, the Bali Climate talks evidently proved that the industrialized countries are not ready to compromise their consumerism and development pace for the sake of global interest. In the Bali climate debate the USA and the advanced developing nations both have kept ways open for carbon emission; although the consequences of delay in the process of reducing
emission will result more climatic catastrophes and social imbalances and massive economic collapse in the least developed countries like Bangladesh. In the negotiation process LDCs were within the group of G 77 and China but ‘the area of interest’ of LDCs and advanced developing countries were different. LDCs, being the majority in G 77 and China, could not put forward
their concerns, e.g. emission mitigation, more adaptation fund, fund based technological support for capacity building etc as these demands contradicts with the interest of G 77 leaders. During the whole way of Bali conference, most of the international civil society organizations and international NGOs were seen busy for advocating adaptation fund, although adaptation without
mitigation is pointless. In fact the Bali ‘road map’ didn’t focus much about the concerns of the LDCs and other developing countries which would be the worst victims of climate change and increasing hydro-metrological disasters. The transition plan for
replacing the Kyoto Protocol, which is so far from the concern of the recent IPCC report as well as from the ‘Bali Mandate’ instead, entrances the power of big business and, the global financial institutions to work on its behalf without committing any Parties to tangible emissions cut.

In the Bali climate negotiation, the countries are found negotiating through three major blocks i) the European Union ii) the United States, supported by Japan and Canada and, iii) the G77 and China. In fact, the G 77 and China group is comprises with over 100 developing countries, including the least developed countries (LDCs) and the small island countries. The agenda of this group was clearly driven by the interest of the advanced developing countries like China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia etc. that only considered their economic growth through continuing industrial carbon emissions. Although it is the historical responsibility of industrialized (Annex I) countries for virtually all emissions leading to the increase in the global atmospheric concentration of GhG but, presently, advanced developing countries are also in the race of increasing GhG emission. The Kyoto Protocol asked for
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ for the advanced developing countries for GhG reduction, but in the Bali conference the USA wanted the advanced developing countries, especially China and India, for binding GhG reduction commitment. Thus the entire politics of Bali Climate conference rounds around the commitment on binding GhG mitigation by the developed and the advanced developing countries. On the 15th Day of December the outcomes of the ‘small group’ deliberation e.g. the draft text convened by the COP President came out proposing the launch of comprehensive two-year negotiation under the UNFCCC with a key aim to enhance national and international GhG mitigation in developed and developing countries. For the developed countries the text says; Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions,including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances. For the developing countries the text says;
measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported by technology and enabled by financing and capacity building (i)

On the same day morning, at the multi plot plenary, the COP president opened the floor for intervention and adoption of the draft text. Portugal, on behalf of the EU, supported the text and called all the parties to support the text. At this point the ‘text conspiracy’ started to disclose. India, subsequently G77 and China, intervene and claimed that the text presented the plenary was not a consensus document. It left out another version from the text without any consent of G 77 and China. The another version what left out from the text was; Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable
and verifiable manner. (ii) The small group’s draft text submitted to the COP President was with two‘bracketed’ options for this paragraph. The difference between the two texts is - In the first text (i) measurable, reportable and verifiable refer to the
mitigation action and, in the second text (ii) measurable, reportable and verifiable refers to the development of country technology, finance and capacity building support, (on which mitigation action will be depending). Reasonably it was the second text supported by the G 77 and China. After rejection of the text by the Indian minister, China called for a point of order and demanded suspensions of the adoption of the proposed draft decision saying that ‘at this very moment the heads of key G 77 delegation, including China, were engaged in discussion with the Indonesian Foreign Minister outside the plenary. So the text, without the consensus of key G 77 leaders should be unauthorized. Again, the plenary started for the third time, with the presence of all key delegates, and the draft text included the left-out text of G77 and China; Portugal, on behalf of EU, supported the draft but soon after the United State rejected the text saying that ‘the United State is not ready to accept the text’.(as the US sought binding reduction commitment from the advanced developing countries like India, China). South Africa, tried to justify G 77
position and said ‘developing countries are voluntarily committing themselves for measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation action. It was totally unthinkable even one year before. Finally the United State, finding no way of avoiding request, resentment of the other country Parties, took the floor and said ‘The United States will join the consensus’’ regarding the proposed compromise text. In a sub plot Bangladesh, on behalf of the LDCs, took the floor and proposed inclusion of ‘differences in national circumstances’ in the G 77 and China proposal. That mean- the responsibilities of the smaller countries or LDCs are
different from the larger, more advanced developing countries and the responsibility of mitigation must be differentiated among developing countries in terms of the size of their economies, level of emission etc. Such very particular concern of Bangladesh didn’t include due to vehement opposition by China and India.

This is how the ‘Bali Roadmap’ adopted through a tense, resentful and, should say, professional diplomacy. The G77 and China committed itself to ‘measurable reportable and verifiable mitigation actions, but not measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation commitments’. Therefore the ‘firm stand’ of G 77 and China group was only on the ‘right’ to continue polluting on the grounds as they are still in the stage of developing. That was completely counter to the agenda of the LDCs that are typically more vulnerable to the climate change and continuing
emission will put them even in the worse position. Being a part of the G77 and China Group the advanced developing countries
on their part played the game very successfully. They also succeeded to ensure that as far as it concern emission reduction of the developing countries, a grouping that unreasonably includes LDCs, the provision would apply equally and uniformly to all countries including the poorest ones, as far as the legal text is concerned.

In fact, Bali climate conference sidelined its major agenda, emission reduction’ and has focused on alternate ways of carbon capture through Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) and emission reduction through CDM both of which are basically on the basis of market mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol currently only allows developing countries to promote afforestation and reforestation to tap financial incentives from carbon trading in the forestry sector which is being criticized by many countries as the system is too complicated. And, thus REDD came into focus in the Bali Roadmap.
Indonesia and fellow 10 tropical forest nations Brazil, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Columbia, Congo, the Democratic republic of Congo, Gabon, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Peru have set up a coalition to promote REDD in the Bali conference on climate change, demanding developed nations provide financial incentives to tropical forest countries in order to prevent forest
deforestation and degradation. REDD gained unparallel attention during the Bali Climate Change Conference and still remains as a controversial issue. Theoretically, REDD could potentially benefit implementing countries environmentally and economically as countries, supposedly, will get incentives for storing carbons in the reserve forests. However, the countries remained divided over whether the financial incentives will be raised based on a market mechanism or from a fund based mechanism. Neither the mechanisms, market nor fund based, would work if committed incentives are not given, managed and distributed among the related stakeholders. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), the largest of such funds, can mobilize about USD 1 billion in several years wherein the carbon market has crossed USD 5 billion in 2007 alone. Besides, the market mechanism puts developing and industrialized countries on the same trading level which is neither fair nor realistic.

In fact, carbon trading is an allure to the LDCs and developing countries and a discriminatory solution of climate change. This may benefit the poor countries but will foreclose their ‘right to development’ and will allow the industrialized countries to keep on increasing GhG emission.

In relation to fund based mechanism, it has been seen that funds are largely replenished by ‘good will’ from the industrialized countries and are largely unpredictable; as despite repeated call the industrialized countries are reluctant to provide 0.7 percent of their GNP to the LDCs as development aid. Developing countries might worry that a new global agreement on emissions,
like so many other international agreements, like aid for trade of the WTO, will leave them in disadvantageous position. Thus, implementation of REDD would largely be depended on the effective participation and support from the industrialized countries.
There also have several major challenges which to be considered in the implementation of REDD

a) Rain forests have been plundering to ensure supply for pulp industry, or being replaced by oil palm plantations and other forms of commercial use. Commercial forest products are the major export items of many countries. In many developing countries such un-sustainable export led economic policies were advocated and imposed by IFIs which should be reviewed.
b) Aid ineffectiveness due to corruption and ill-governance is a common phenomenon in most of the developing countries. REDD may not succeed if underlying causes of ill-governance and deforestation: corruption, tenurial security, illegal logging, fires are not adequately addressed.

c) REDD must include civil society organizations, local government in the decision making and implementation and incorporate community perspectives and needs.

There are many questions yet unanswered about exactly how the REDD would be piloted. How can forest degradation be monitored and measured in an efficient and political way? How can incentives be aligned to promote sustainable management of the forests while targeting revenues to forest communities? How the political will be generated to make the necessary investments etc. should be addressed properly.

Developing countries, especially the small island countries and the LDCs, would require significant amounts of extra financing support as they will be the most affected by climate change and with fragile economic and technological capacity to cope. In Bali climate conference many countries, developing and least developed, civil society groups, international NGOs all were found busy advocating for more adaptation fund and its transparent management. Although adaptation fund is essentially required for the poor
and climate-risk countries but adaptation without mitigation is pointless. On the other hand, the fund’s total capital is too low; to date only USD 230 million has been committed to the UNFCCC’s adaptation funds, of which only USD 48 millions has been delivered to support LDC’s adaptation. A 2007 study by Oxfam International estimates that at least approximately USD 50 billion will be needed annually to support adaptation in the developing countries if current GhG emission rates are stabilized.
The adaptation fund taken from the 2 percent of the total value of the world’s clean development mechanism (CDM) including carbon trading has now reached around USD 100 million a year, but is expected to grow rapidly, and can reach billions of dollars as the value of CDM continues to grow. Developed countries wanted GEF to mange adaptation fund, but the developing countries have wanted a different institution because they found the GEF funding model difficult to access. The GEF, housed within the World Bank, was created as the mechanism for compensating developing countries for the additional costs of undertaking activities to preserve bio-diversity, prevent desertification, and protect the Earth’s climate. Thus, GEF is
managing a trust fund channeled to CDM mechanism but, the Parties demanded, adaptation fund should be managed through another different channel. The battle, however, over the management and governance setting on the adaptation fund surprisingly solved, although many thought the adaptation fund negotiation would carry on until the bitter end of the Bali Climate negotiation.

The outcome was seen by many as ‘a major victory for the developing world in setting a new governance system for funding of
adaptation activities’ as quoted by the South African Minister who led the final stages of the negotiation on behalf of the G 77 and China. Therefore, Bali meeting agreed to establish an independent Adaptation Fund Board -with members selected by and under the direct authority of the COP/MOP. This board will be entitled for all the financial mechanisms of the adaptation fund,
independent of the previously only operating entity: the GEF that now only will be providing secretariat services. The organization set-up of the adaptation fund also different from that of other UN funds, especially for the most vulnerable countries, that countries are given direct access to that fund, without having involvement of ‘implementing agencies’ like the World Bank, UNDP, or UNEP.

But concern still remains how to increase the amounts of compensatory adaptation financing for the developing countries, both in the context of filling up the voluntary multilateral adaptation funds under the UNFCCC and on a bilateral basis and, how to extend cooperation and finance to the climate change related extreme weather events, in the context of disaster preparedness, humanitarian assistance, climate disaster preparedness, emergency response and rehabilitation. These financial mechanisms should
be developed and provided by the developed countries, of course, in addition to their existing official development assistance (ODA) commitment of 0.7 percent of their GNP, as compensation for the historical responsibility of the developed countries in being the main drivers of current global climate change. Again, the LDCs and many of the developing countries are not getting
required support out of the CDM fund. Within the developing countries, countries of advanced economies like China, India are the prime beneficiaries of CDM fund; countries that suffer most from the climate change are not getting needful support from the CDM as they aren’t hugely involved with development activities where CDM could fits. So the conditionality and procedure of CDM fund should be simplified so that countries of highly exposed to climate change impact would have equal access to that fund

Climate change is a major challenge of the twenty-first century, more so for the Asia- Pacific region its high vulnerability due to relatively large poor populations with low adaptive capacity. Indeed, 90 percent of the global climate related disaster affected the region and contributed to over a half a million deaths since the 1950s. Current evidence thus suggests that the key drivers of the both social and economic developments are adversely affected by climate change. Therefore, it is necessary to consider climate change related issues and impacts in our development planning; besides we also have to demand for climate justice united with other least developed and climate-risk countries. In this perspective our recommendations are;

a) Raising political awareness on the impact of climate change so that political parties declare their ‘specific position’ in the
upcoming election manifesto.

b) We should not be so optimistic for getting necessary adaptation fund. Thus we should finance for appropriate adaptive technology development

c) In country level we have developed ‘coastal zone management policy’ which has been praised as we documented. This policy documents also indented some 26 projects for implementation, which afterward approved in the ministerial meting. We demand the present government to initiate few of these projects in the SIDR affected area as a part of ‘rehabilitation and development program’.

d) We are fore-seeing that like ‘aid for trade’ of the WTO negotiation LDCs are again swallowing the pills of ‘adaptation fund’-which is mere a carrot dangled under the noses of the LDCs. We should not be allured for so called ‘adaptation fund’, rather we should raise our voice for carbon emission reduction.

e) Consultants of controversial international organizations, the World Bank, MF, ADB, multinational business corporations, donor agencies, oil and gas exploration companies etc. should not be the part of government delegation. Because they may not contribute neutrally for the national interest ignoring his/her employer’s internet.

f) International negotiation should be led by related ministries or departments along with the ministry of Foreign Affairs. There should have some level of continuation of participation of the delegates, especially of the subject-matter specialists and expert delegates. Besides, prior to and after participation in international events/ negotiation government should disclose its position publicly.

g) Annually we are subsidizing huge money on fossil fuel import. The primary beneficiary of this subsidized fuel is urban middle class. Country should not expense more for the luxury of urban middle class, rather it should redirect test effort for boosting rural economy and revitalizing agriculture based subsistence economy. We should define strategies for saving urban power consumption and supplying to the rural areas. Several energy saving strategies;
i) expand renewable energy (solar) even in the urban household and non-industrialized sub-urban areas, ii) compulsory
introduction of energy savings bulb and limiting the uses of air-conditioner, iii) introduce car free day, once in a week iv) banning imports of luxurious and more energy consuming cars, all cars more than 2000 CC,

h) We propose formation of ‘National Public Company’ for the utilization and management of country’s precious natural resources like Coal, Gas, Oil, Forest etc. We also propose formation of ‘National Energy Policy’ for longterm basis.
i) Introduction of market based vocational trainings for the coastal people, especially for the women, who, presently, are under threat of forced migration to be caused by sea level rise.

j) We propose forwarding the issue of Mode 4 (free movement of natural person) negotiation of GATS of WTO and finding the ways for the migration of environmental refugees to the other countries. Already, there is an agreement between Australia and Papua that Australia will allow climate refugees from Papua and Tuvalu .

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